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The Origins and Shaping of English Royalist Thought

Seventeenth-century English royalist thought has often been mentioned in passing, and parts of it have been studied as they occur in the course of other investigation. It has never received full-length, independent treatment.¹ No such treatment can be attempted in this paper. What it hopes to do is something much more modest but perhaps just as necessary — to consider the general characteristics of royalist political thought insofar as they reveal its intellectual and political origins, and its interaction with the crises which shaped it. Such treatment will no doubt require more generalization and less detailed examination than historians usually like to see, but it is unavoidable if we are trying to understand the place of a complex movement in the historical continuum.²

English royalism was first of all English. It was not a derivation from some general thing called royalism, though of course it had its affinities with the royalism of other places and times. It was a way in which men of a certain period in history looked at the peculiarly English constitutional and political experience. It is naturally tempting to see it as an attenuated form of something else, a half-hearted attempt at “real”, continental royalism, or a shrewd compromise between that real royalism and English constitutional realities — a sort of royalism-and-water. On the contrary, royalism grew quite naturally out of the native soil, native needs, native experience. This is not to say that it excluded “foreign” or non-English influences. Since England was part of the larger European culture, the English experience participated in the larger experience. So it is not surprising that English royalism reflected a philosophical or cosmological tradition with thoroughly non-English origins, which permeated the whole of contemporary European civilization, and yet was perhaps better suited to the English social and political milieu than to that of any other European community.

Royalism was shaped by the English past. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the monarchy shaped the English community. To an extent without parallel on the continent, Englishmen owned a personal allegiance to the king from Saxon days. This allegiance, reinforced by Norman energy and

thoroughness, provided the basis for a growing network of institutions which knitted the community and the king together. This in turn encouraged a unity capable of modifying the strong local loyalties of the medieval world, a unity which, for example, helped Plantagenet England to defeat the much richer and more populous France in the fourteenth century. It allowed a Catholic England to erect an independent church under the aegis of the crown, and to do so with surprisingly little opposition, considering the issues at stake. And it allowed the production of a Shakespeare who could incarnate the national literary genius to an extent never equalled since. England came early to nationhood for many reasons, some of them geographical, but among them the institution of national monarchy must rank very high.

Even more striking were the political developments which took place under that monarchy, and mostly with its blessing. Both the whig historians and the general anti-authoritarian bias of the democratic world have accustomed us to seeing the growth of English liberties as a process by which they were wrung from unwilling royal hands by a heroic populace. This has its share of historical foundation, but it is not the whole story, or even the greater part of it. It is far closer to the truth to say that these liberties grew out of the monarchy, were created and sustained by it.

The common law, for example, was at once the expression of the community's tradition and the king's law-making power. Growing out of Norman feudalism, including some pre-Norman elements, and incorporating deliberate royal initiatives, it blended the king's rights with those of his subjects. When Edward I issued his great reforming statutes, he accomplished something of a revolution, but he did it after consulting those whom it affected, and thus at one and the same time safeguarded the interests of the crown and those of the subjects – or those of them with enough power to make their weight felt. If the law was an expression of royal will, it was not thereby a mere royal whim. Thus the Germanic conception of law as the custom of the community was not destroyed, but subtly transmuted and yet preserved within the newer conception, reminiscent of Roman law, in which the sovereign was the source of law.³ If the law was the king's law, enforced by the king's officers in the king's courts, it was also very largely the customary law of the community, or new law made as good as customary by community consent. And it could be seen, not as something which tied the king's hands, but the sinews of those hands, the way in which the king ruled an obedient nation. So the growth of an organized scheme of rule by law was not a danger to a monarch, but rather an indispensable expression of his sovereignty.

This unique combination of liberty and authority is just as evident in

the origins of the governing structures. When kings, most notably Henry II, erected a scheme of local self-government throughout England, they did not do so out of a disinterested love of freedom, but to keep a modicum of public order on the cheap. "Self-government at the king's command" was just that. It kept order, it saved the king from having to pay a civil service (impossible at that time anyway), and it matched the onerous burdens of local politics with the knowledge that, in return for hard work, the local politicians would have the security of themselves enforcing the law upon themselves. It gave the king a stake in maintaining liberties, while it gave the subjects a stake in maintaining the king's law. And the king was the prime mover in its construction.

The place where legal traditions and government structures intersect is Parliament. No myth is more strongly entrenched in our "racial memory" than that of the English parliament as the expression of the people's struggle to enforce limitations on a grudging monarch. This too is less than half the truth. As scholars as disparate as S.B. Chrimes and Bertrand de Jouvenel have emphasized, medieval assemblies made the king more, not less, powerful, and were the expression of the king's desire for greater resources and smoother obedience to royal commands.⁴ The financial demands and political ambitions of thirteenth-century monarchs dictated the need to search for new ways of gaining the community's cooperation in raising unprecedented sums of money and streamlining the governmental structures. If the king was to transmute feudal rights into the wider powers of a late medieval sovereign, he had to do so in a way that assured the community that its liberties would be secured under the new dispensation.

The kings of England were most successful in this enterprise. The financial rights of the feudal suzerain, limited in volume and clumsy in manner of collection, were more or less smoothly changed into the much larger sums of customs and fractional taxes which could be agreed upon in one "national bargain" in parliament, and even levied at the cost of the community, rather than the king. The need for new laws to cover the greatly changed necessities of a growing community was met by a device which speeded up the process of change and assured that the classes in charge of law-enforcement would accept the changes because it had had a voice in determining their nature. In short, the basis of national political life was altered from that of feudal localism to that of a more centralized and efficient government. The monarchy had succeeded in throwing up institutions which fulfilled its new requirements, and those of the community. For the strength of the monarchy was also the security for what the time understood as the people's liberty. The "Lancastrian experiment" showed what happened when the monarchy lost its grip: "Many acts of

Parliament/Few kept with true intent". And the Yorkist-Tudor revival further emphasized the symbiosis of public liberty and royal authority; without the latter, there could be little security for the former.⁵

The Reformation made surprisingly little change in this symbiosis. Even under the arguably despotic Henry VIII, the most high-handed acts were done according to law. Parliaments were built into the greater power of the crown, a power which now included sovereignty in church as well as state. The frequent, though hardly constant, conflicts between Elizabeth and the Commons were not just the result of Puritan zeal or royal stubbornness; they were the nearly inescapable consequence of the way in which the Reformation had been enacted, had had to be enacted, into law. So the new element of religious sovereignty, while it brought new theoretical claims and a new sense of awe to the crown, also brought a concomitant need for parliamentary cooperation. Since the famous "prerogative" courts of the period never posed a threat to the common law, that feature of the symbiosis also remained intact.⁶ The liberty-authority balance thus remained stable.

It is thus no wonder that in 1600 royalists felt exceedingly comfortable in their history. And in 1600, just about everyone in England was what came to be called "royalist", because there was no reason to be anything else. English royalism was not the exotic importation of James I, or the result of continental influences like Roman law or Renaissance despotism. It was the natural result of centuries of generally amiable companionship between a strong government under God's vicegerent and a tradition of law-based personal liberty which was inextricably combined with that government. Though later events were to expose the difficulties inherent in such a relationship, the received mentality saw no essential conflict in it.

So it should not be surprising to find that Bracton is among the most frequently-cited authors in royalist literature, that Bodin had far less influence even on royalist theory than did Sir Edward Coke, who is much more widely quoted. Nor is it simply a matter of using Bodin as far as he did not conflict with Coke. The matter is much subtler, and the manner of its subtlety revealing. The royalists ingested Bodin into the tradition studied by Coke, showing little embarrassment in doing so, and producing an amalgam which might be described as nine parts Coke to one part Bodin, or better, Coke's legal basis reflected on at the theoretical level of Bodin, the result comprising something different from both. English royalism was composed of a constitutional-legal tradition reflected on at the level of political thought, in one sense the Anglicizing of theory, in another the theorizing of English experience.

But there was more to it than any combination of constitutional and political thought. There was also the almost unconsciously-held world-view, what T.S. Eliot called the "pre-political" basis of political thought, "The stratum down to which any sound political thinking must push its roots, and from which it must derive its nourishment".⁷ This is to be found in the Elizabethan world picture of "cosmic harmony". Even those royalists who lived on into the eighteenth century were shaped by that strange and fascinating blend of Graeco-Roman science and medieval philosophy, which implied a whole complex of ideas moral, metaphysical and scientific. Such ideas existed in the air people breathed, gave their form and coloration to conclusions which had nothing directly to do with them, because they were the idiom in terms of which people naturally discussed a wide variety of subjects. They were the assumptions of an age.⁸

The master-assumption was a belief in teleology, that all creation is inter-related in a rational scheme, and that consequently each part of it contains both a meaning which can be applied to other parts, and a possibility of affecting the operations of the other parts. The instrument for both learning and applying these relations was the analogy. Thus the distinctive mark of the system was the use of analogies and similitudes involving parts of the Great Chain of Being, the Aristotelian-Ptolemaic astronomy, the parts of the body, the four elements, the four humours, the music of the spheres, the cosmic dance, marriage and the family. They are signs which dominate much of political thought in the early part of the seventeenth century, and which remain visible, though not so prominent, in royalist thought thereafter.

The importance of this world-view extends much deeper than the mere use of these analogies. It is the inner characteristics more than the explicit correspondences which give it its greatest importance for an understanding of political thought. The most important are a concept of law, a concept of balance, and a concept of hierarchy. And opposed to them are three great fears — the fear of arbitrary will, of excess, and of any effort by man to rebel. In a sense, they are all one fear, that men will try to create their own values, rather than acknowledging those that are implicit in human and non-human nature.

When these concepts are applied to politics, they issue in an exaltation of the king as the pinnacle of the human hierarchy, indeed as the human analogy to God. But in the same similitude is the emphasis that as God rules through law, so must the king — that law is the perfect expression of sovereignty. Law is a limit to action, a limit to will, a concession that all things are bound to their roles in the scheme of things. That which submits to law is therefore that which most fulfils its own role in the natural order. And

political sovereignty perfectly expresses itself by taking the form of law, which is at once the will of the king and a rational rule that binds that will. Since law dictates that everything must keep its place, the notion of balance is directly implied as well. No part of creation, even the highest, can usurp the place of another, however low, without impairing the whole. Thus human society and the state must be balanced, just like the humours in the body, for the preponderance of one constituent element would lead to excess and overweening imbalance, a kind of political sickness. The higher powers can command the lower, but can never deny them their necessary rights, without threatening the whole structure, including the rights of the higher. Harmony demands that everything depend on everything else. The very notion of hierarchy limits the operations of the higher portions by establishing an inherent relation with the lower, a relation which these higher elements cannot change. This mutuality of right brings the fear of rebellion and excess to the protection of the lower as well as the higher powers in political society.

The whole system is profoundly moral. Since man finds reality rather than making it, moral laws are objective, and all political rights and obligations are based on them. There is no question of politics having its own autonomous moral life; all morality is of a piece. And all morality takes the form of a law which is much more than a command, even the command of God. The notion of law as simply the will of the sovereign is foreign to cosmic harmony. Law is that, in a way, but it is a great deal else besides.

It must be obvious how well this idea-system jibes with the constitutional tradition which everyone inherited in 1600, and which royalists (and not only royalists) were to try to perpetuate.⁹ English law was the command of the king, but it had also a complex basis apart from, though not independent of, that command. It could not be changed at will, even by the law-maker. The different parts of the body politic depend on the head, but it must respect their functions or maim the whole body and thus ruin itself. The king is not the creator of society, only its director and guarantor. The sovereignty of the king is no threat to the liberty of the subject, nor vice versa, since each depends on the other for its life, and supports the other by the proper discharge of its functions. And the English system of government is not just a convenient arrangement, but a municipal reflection of the higher order of things, subject to natural laws of right and wrong, and sustained by moral sanctions intrinsically superior to force or will.¹⁰

This way of thinking about the theoretical side of government was nearly as common to the men who wrote or spoke about government as was the "royalism" which had come down from the past political experience. It is found in plays, poems, sermons, assize-charges, judgements, speeches, even

letters and journals. And there are substantial signs of it in works more directly concerned with politics. Hooker was the harmonist writer par excellence, but the same set of ideas is found, in varying degrees, in the works of Charles Merbury, Sir John Hayward, William Craig, Edward Forset, Fulke Greville, Sir Walter Raleigh, and of course the royal schoolmaster himself. It is shared by John Pym, Sir Thomas Wentworth and Sir John Eliot. These men agreed on much more than they disagreed on, whatever their roles in the struggles of the early seventeenth century.¹¹

Jacobean publicists are easily seen as uncritical king-worshippers, and it is true that most political opinion exalted the king and his rights against claims to popular sovereignty or forcible resistance. If the king was "absolute", what was absolutely excluded by such a quality was any possibility of deposition, and the influence of the Monarchomachs, reinforced by Gunpowder Plot and the lively question of papal pretensions to a right of deposition, entailed an emphasis on royal power as against external threats. In this atmosphere, writers were not much interested in the inner structure of the monarchy, the relation of the subject's rights to a king whose title is not being challenged. Because writers are silent altogether on the rights of the subject, or only make perfunctory mention of them, it is tempting to assume that those rights found no place in their minds. It is here that cosmic harmony plays such an important role, because it provides a key to the way in which they avoided sacrificing popular liberty to absolute monarchy. When virtually everyone thinks of sovereignty and law and government itself in a framework which automatically reconciles liberty and authority by, as it were, including the former in the latter, modern minds unfamiliar with this mode of thought are bound to jump to misleading conclusions about what is happening to Englishmen's love of liberty. In fact, as Professor Judson among others has pointed out, nearly all Englishmen agreed on the basic principles of political thought until the 1640s. If those principles were more often expressed in terms of authority than of liberty, the motif of harmony or balance provided the means to preserve an unquestioned respect of ancestral traditions of liberty.¹²

The Civil War brought this period of universal royalism to an end, and ushered in what might be called the classical age of English political thought. Now begins the career of royalist political thought as a reasonably self-conscious and well-defined interpretation in opposition to other theoretical formulations which also sprang from within the national milieu. No longer the opinions of a nation but of a party, royalism gains in definition what it loses in breadth of support. The pamphlet war which began in 1642 produced the characteristic outlines of English royalist thought which later developments would amplify but not contradict. Probably the ablest

representatives of this thought were Henry Ferne, Dudley Digges, Bishop John Bramhall, and Judge David Jenkins.¹³ Neither they nor the many others who made contributions of varying quality can be considered first-rate theorists by any means, but they did bring out the recognizable features of a coherent theoretical position. Initially they had only to show that their parliamentary opponents were unable to substantiate the Houses' claims from the precedents of English history, which they did well enough. But when those claims were based on wider argument from the nature of society itself, as they were by Henry Parker and his successors, royalism had to do more than quote statutes. Now came the attempt to reconcile royal sovereignty with that "mixed monarchy" which the king's own writers had adopted in the Answer to the Nineteen Propositions.¹⁴ Absolute monarchy had to be distinguished from arbitrary tyranny, and the liberties of Englishmen derived from a sovereignty which could be seen as a support rather than a danger. Divine right and non-resistance had to be squared with those same liberties, and the doctrines of self-limited sovereignty and prescription which emerge in the attempt remain essential to English royalism for the rest of the century.

With defeat, the stream trickled down, despite a brief revival at the end of the decade when the King's execution loomed to threaten the existence of monarchy itself, as earlier opponents had hesitated to do. Now royalists were joined by the more moderate of their erstwhile foes, and themselves dropped back to more basic divine-right defences of the monarchy, troubling themselves less about its specific powers or its relations to liberty.¹⁵ The 1650s were a lean time for them, so hopeless was their political situation, and, strangely enough, they said little more after the Restoration, when their prosperity seemed to make argument as pointless as had their earlier adversity. Yet some important works were published during this doldrum period, especially by Bramhall, Peter Heylyn and Robert Sheringham.¹⁶ And it was during the lean years that Bishop Robert Sanderson's definitive statement of the extent of obligation to a usurper became widely known. This famous casuist's careful distinctions tried to guide faithful royalists through the *de facto* pitfalls of the Interregnum, and were to be appealed to later by Jacobites.¹⁷

With the coming of the Exclusion Crisis, royalist political thought revives. The obvious issue here was infeasible hereditary right, and this brought with it such related issues as the nature of fundamental law, the basis of regal and popular rights, the origins of human government and the nature of sovereignty itself. There are echoes of Civil War controversy, and a considerable overlapping with the arguments found there, but the emphasis is quite different, since the Crisis revolved around the succession, a problem not raised in the earlier period. At this stage the ablest royalist (or Tory) writers

are John Nalson, William Falkner, George Hickes and Sir George Mackenzie, with the historian Robert Brady adding a powerful historical foundation to the more analytical approach of the others.¹⁸ Their argument boils down to this, that it was beyond the power of the sovereign, with or without parliamentary consent, to change the fundamental law of succession. Around that adamant assertion was organized the rest of the previously established royalist theory.

This obviously led into Jacobite argument after 1688. Almost all Tory publicists either defended James' claim or took refuge in silence. Their defence took two forms. The more expected, the general assertion that the Revolution could not cancel James' lawful claims, was really less important than the bitter attacks generated by Dr. William Sherlock's decision to take the oath to William and Mary. Sherlock advanced the ingenious argument that, while they did not enjoy a lawful title, they were promoted to the throne by God's providence, to which men must defer in defiance of law.¹⁹ This doctrine, which has been called "divine providential right," was scathingly attacked by some of the ablest writers ever to represent the cause of royalist political thought. George Hickes is present once again, and he was probably the best synoptic mind, the best systematizer, among English royalists. Just as effective in this dispute were Thomas Wagstaffe, Jeremy Collier and Robert Jenkyn.²⁰ Despite its narrow range of material and monstrously tedious repetition, this is a most important controversy in the career of English royalism. What degree of obedience is owing to a usurper, how much action should be taken against him and how can an originally illegitimate regime become legitimate? These were questions which any theory with a moral basis had to face, and face in a way which would be both faithful to its own principles and applicable to the known facts of history, where many regimes had origins which would hardly bear scrupulous examination. The Sherlock controversy also provides a symmetrical ending for royalist thought. He tried to hide behind Bishop Overal's *Convocation Book*, a record of the conclusions of the Convocation of 1606, but only published in 1690. So that the unity of royalist thought is underlined by its ending close to where it began. In some respects, it had come full circle, and represented in its moment of defeat what it had once shared with practically everyone.

Some indication should now be given of what royalists concluded about government. Though none of them ever stated such conclusions in full, and many variations inevitably occur within their works, a brief summary would go like this:

All authority of one man over another comes from God, but human

circumstances usually decide how God's authority is mediated. All governments were originally monarchies, in Adam's case and in the cases of primitive communities, because they grew out of families; the father's power is analogically related to the king's.

As states grew large, family relationship grew tenuous, lines died out, groups migrated. Some states remained monarchies, some became aristocracies, some democracies. In all, God remains the source of authority, and it is a sin to resist whatever form that authority takes. All forms are good and legitimate, but monarchy is the best because the first and most natural (i.e. the government best fitting the pattern of nature for unity and hierarchy). It is also the most stable.

Within the monarchies themselves, variations developed. Some are arbitrary, like Turkey; since there is no real law in them, they are little better than organized slavery. Most are absolute; France and Spain are such, and so is England. All these have some form of limitation of the ruler's will by law, his own law, England moreso than the others. They remain true absolute monarchies, because the ruler is not limited from outside. Some states, like Poland, are very close to aristocracies, and Venice probably is one. The best monarchies are *balanced*, and combine some characteristics of aristocracy and democracy. They remain true, "complete" monarchies nonetheless, and, like the human person, gain additional strength from a harmonic combination of elements.

The sovereign's law is not the expression of arbitrary will, but of settled, impersonal will. Laws which concede liberties to the people bind the ruler too, and are the indispensable mark of a civilized state, a perfect monarchy. They are the form taken by royal power, rather than an external limitation, and are made more binding by time and usage.

How do new governments arise? When royal lines die out, the community can change to another family or another form of government, through some form of consent. The new government then has God's authority behind it. Conquest may establish a legitimate rule, provided it does not involve clear breaches of certain criteria (which remain rather ill-defined). Usurpation is never justified, but a usurper, or his successors, may become legitimate (i.e. cease to be a usurper) if certain conditions are met (e.g. disappearance of previous line or complete disappearance of other form of government, withdrawal of claim by legitimate line, peaceful and voluntary acceptance of new rule over a considerable period of time). The degree of obedience due to usurpers was held to vary with circumstances, but was always to be grudging.

All government was based on divine and natural law. If it commanded against that law, it must be disobeyed, and punishment accepted. When it does so command, it is actually weakening its own power by challenging the authority on which it rests. Government is inherently limited; sovereignty is never really omniscient.

Such are the bare bones of the political thought produced by English royalists. What were the intellectual resources on which they drew? First and foremost, of course, was the Bible, for royalists were thoroughly Protestant Englishmen. Seen as God's revelation to man, it was at once the repository of specific commands affecting human government, and a most reliable record of man's past, from which could be drawn purely secular principles not directly dependent on faith. Thus it was a source of both natural and supernatural wisdom, and the failure to notice this can lead to an undervaluing of the secular element in royalist thought. So can the failure to notice the way in which authors distinguish among levels of applicability of the different episodes in the Old Testament. Some were held to contain absolutely binding examples of divine law, others were only probable indicators of human conduct, while some were carefully pointed out as unique to Jewish experience and not binding at all in the seventeenth century. Within the terms of the age, argument from Scripture could be fairly sophisticated.

No one can read royalist work without being acutely, not to say woefully, conscious of the biblical element. Romans Thirteen was only the tip of the iceberg, and a huge tip it was. Nevertheless, royalists usually tried to establish a natural basis for their conclusions, complementary to if not entirely independent of the supernatural. Given Renaissance culture, it was easy enough to find non-biblical and even non-Christian material. Cosmic harmony itself was predominantly pagan in origins, and so were many other influences. Of these, perhaps the greatest was Aristotle. In two specific aspects of political thought, he reigned almost unchallenged. His division of states into monarchy, aristocracy and democracy (with his analyses and variations of them) was perhaps the single most widely accepted truism of the age. Less obtrusive but quite important were his four causes, material, efficient, formal and final, in terms of which many problems in theory were expressed. Joined with the logic still so popular in the universities, these facets of Aristotelianism dictated basic modes of thought, pervasive assumptions which determined much of what one might call the conservative nature of royalist theory.²¹ It was perfectly fitting that Hobbes, the man who represented the most thorough-going alternative approach to political thought, should sneer at the man whom one royalist pamphleteer called "the chief secretary of nature," and that Filmer, in trying to put forward a

revolutionary version of royalism, should have to twist Aristotle to his purpose.²²

After Aristotle, the greatest impact of the classical world probably came from Cicero and Seneca.²³ Both were invaluable for their strikingly moral view of political life, a view which pervaded Renaissance humanism, and one without which English royalism made no sense at all. In addition, Cicero's preoccupation with the meaning of law supplied a gap left by Aristotle, and his notion of law as perfectly fulfilling freedom was precisely fitted to support the motif of reconciliation of two apparent opposites. The prestige of Seneca had been great for centuries; royalists were mostly interested in his reflections on the moral problems posed by political power, and some of them were especially indebted to him for his use of the Roman distinction between political power, which belonged to the prince, and property rights, which remained in the subject. (Through this the sovereign could be conceded the full power of government without threatening the liberties of the subject).²⁴ Other authors are quoted more frequently than Seneca, but, like Cicero, he seems to have great qualitative importance because he was so well attuned to the moral presuppositions of royalism.

Behind them in importance one finds such as Thucydides, Livy, Plutarch and Tacitus. This class of author, though quoted frequently enough, does not seem to have affected the deepest level of royalist thinking, but it provided a host of illustration and evidence. It is interesting that this sort of classical material was the same appealed to by republicans like Milton and Sidney, and denounced by Hobbes as a source of rebellious principles. Royalists read these authors differently. They were conventionally useful, as were Josephus, Polybius and the rest of the ancient historians.²⁵

In certain types of pamphlet there is a great deal of early Christian theological and historical material (as, for example, in Hickeys' *Jovian*). The late imperial Roman lawyers and Justinian also figure prominently in works concerned with legal concepts, and are always used in such a way that their legal maxims are either made to appear consistent with English law or else are clearly distinguished from it in a manner which supports the royalist interpretation of the latter.²⁶ There is little confusion of the two systems. The one author of the Patristic Age who does not appear as often as one might expect is St. Augustine. He simply figures as one of the Fathers, and St. John Chrysostom is probably referred to oftener.²⁷ One reason for this is probably the Augustinian contempt for the secular power, another the fact that the Augustinian tradition was so often seen as one of voluntarism, as in Calvin and Luther. The royalists, children of a world-view as rationalistic as cosmic harmony, could not feel very much at home with St. Augustine.

Medieval Roman law and canon law do figure, but only in certain contexts appropriate to them, not at all generally. The great medieval contribution to royalism is found in the common law, on one hand, and the chroniclers and historians, on the other. Bracton's dictum that the king was under God and the law, but not man, was a frequently-quoted expression in their works.²⁸ Most royalists used it without noticeable hedging, as they did with other Bractonian material, and in a sense their whole corpus is a footnote to it. Fortescue was also grist to their mill, though not without some difficulty. But their lawyers, especially Jenkins, relied heavily on legal and parliamentary records and on the great legal commentaries, especially Plowden and Coke, and the historians, especially Camden.²⁹

During the Civil War period such material had been effectively used in works such as Jenkins' *Lex Terrae*, which was reprinted and widely used during the Exclusion Crisis. That crisis itself produced the historical works of Robert Brady, which were a very strong support for royalist interpretation of the constitution.³⁰

But Brady was only the most thorough and organized of the royalist writers on this subject. Almost all of them proved knowledgeable about English history, and used the kind of material on which Clarendon had depended in the manifestos which he wrote for Charles I in early 1642, which other Civil War writers improved upon, and which Filmer brought to a very high point of learning in *The Freeholder's Grand Inquest*. So closely associated with general royalist opinion was this type of evidence that most contemporaries attributed the *Inquest*, not to Filmer, but to a royalist lawyer, Robert Holborne, who had been one of Hampden's counsel in the Ship Money case.³¹ It was William Prynne, converted by the regicides to a kind of semi-royalism, who broadcast Filmer's material, and many royalists quote Prynne as their authority on the constitution. In the 1680's, it was Prynne who took his place with Bracton, Coke, Plowden and Camden as the typical royalist source of historico-constitutional argument.³²

The use of sixteenth-century writers varies greatly. English Reformation divines appear, and of course the Homilies on rebellion produced by some of them in 1547 and 1571. It is in this context of non-resistance doctrine that Calvin and Luther occasionally occur, especially the former, though these are less direct influences than prestigious pegs on which to hang a contention. Obviously it is impossible to imagine seventeenth-century Anglican royalism without the great figures who made the Reformation, but they are not used very much.³³ The really overt influences from this were largely negative, and came chiefly from the Monarchomach writers, the Catholic apologists like Parsons and Bellarmine, and the absolutists like Barclay whose opinions were

more congenial to English royalists. With the exception of the last mentioned, these sources provided both a target for royalist shafts and a whetstone against which royalist opinion could sharpen its own contrary convictions. Almost all English political writers owed much to such men, and royalists had to share in this influence.³⁴

Among continental sources, Bodin has a special place. Some royalists owed him a good deal, others casually refer to a great name. One sometimes senses a certain puzzlement about what to do with him. Much of his thought jibed with English royalism, but some scarcely applied at all, and some was quite inconsistent with English traditions. His formulation of the concept of sovereignty affected all political theorists of the day, but it is difficult to guess how much came directly from him, and how much was "in the air". His name appears with respectable but not overwhelming frequency. It does not occur, nor do his ideas occur, often enough to provide a version of sovereignty which would outweigh the English legal tradition.³⁵

Hooker and James I did not receive the attention which their reputations might be thought to merit. It may be that most royalists shared so much of the former's philosophical outlook and the latter's sense of the majesty of kingship that reference would have been otiose. More likely, Hooker was kept at arm's length because of his lack of overt royalism, and James' name would hardly throw any lustre over the cause which he so tactlessly touted. Sir Walter Raleigh was mentioned as often as either, probably more often. But the near-contemporary who attracted most attention as an authority was Grotius. Few people are referred to with more consequence, more sense of wielding a weighty name. Obviously royalists could not accept all his ideas, but the degree of acceptance is striking. Where they agree, they treat the agreement as triumphant proof of their own wisdom, and where they disagree, they are careful to speak of him with profound respect. A distinguished Protestant from a famous republic, he was a most convenient support to them and an embarrassment to their opponents. And he was much more than a debating-point; he seems to have had a genuinely educative influence, and he probably had a lot to do with making royalists more aware of the complexity of the problem of the origin of political societies, and the nearly unavoidable problem of contract or consent. He also seems to have confirmed them in many of their convictions by sharing them and casting over them the great name of a man of thoroughly cosmopolitan intellectual culture. Despite obvious disagreements, royalists felt at home with him.³⁶

Their published work covered a great deal of ground, and included vast numbers of references and betrayed influences which cannot be gone into

here. Obviously many authors not mentioned here were used by royalist writers. Still more obviously, different writers use those cited in different amounts and none use all of them – though Peter Heylyn came very close in *The Stumbling-Block of Disobedience*.³⁷ Some used very few. In the twelve-page *England Bought and Sold*, John Nalson referred only to Cicero, Camden and Coke. (This combination of ancient and modern writers almost always occurs). Most used far more sources than this.³⁸ All used roughly the same representative body of knowledge to produce an analysis suitable to themselves and yet expressing most of the characteristic opinions of their party.

When it comes to tracing the interplay of exactly contemporary influences, the task is virtually impossible. Every author is obviously affected by the man he attacks, Ferne and Bramhall by Parker and Hunton, Sheringham by Hunton and Herle, Jenkins by the early Prynne, Bramhall again by Hobbes, Brady by Somers, Hickes by the author of *Julian the Apostate*, Wagstaffe by Sherlock, and so on. But how did they affect each other? Did they affect each other at all? Sometimes one wonders. Take the example of Robert Sheringham's *The King's Supremacy Asserted*, one of the best royalist pamphlets. Published in 1660, though probably written in the 1640s, it dealt at length with Philip Hunton, Charles Herle and William Bridge, all parliamentarian writers. His treatment is very close to that of Henry Ferne, to whom these authors constantly refer, and who was incomparably the best known royalist writer in the Civil War period. Yet there is scarcely any evidence that he had read any of Ferne's three main pamphlets! And this is only a striking example of a common occurrence. Perhaps royalist material was subject to loss or destruction to an unusually high degree, since it had to cross the fighting-lines to reach London (unless printed in London with a fake Oxford imprint). John Bramhall's *Serpent-Slave*, an interesting and hard-hitting work, was written at York, the headquarters of the king's northern army, and may never have reached London at all; the bookseller-collector George Thomason never got a copy. But these problems could not have affected all royalist work, especially that published after 1660. Seventeenth-century authors did not feel obliged to quote their sources, but many did so, and yet the only royalists frequently cited by colleagues are David Jenkins and Robert Brady, for their legal and historical learning, and Heylyn, Sanderson and Archbishop Usher, who had ecclesiastical reputations to attract notice.³⁹ Few indeed were those like Nathaniel Johnston, who frequently acknowledged his debt to Digges, Sheringham, Nalson and Mackenzie.⁴⁰

Like most controversialists, royalist writers were more interested in their enemies than their friends. Among those enemies, Philip Hunton figures

most prominently, since his adroit use of the theme of mixed monarchy, recalling as it did the king's Answer to the Nineteen Propositions, absolutely demanded serious consideration.⁴¹ Milton also appears, a minor devil who earned condemnation by Oxford University in 1683, as did Richard Baxter, who often figures as a supposed representative of all the political theories of the detested Dissenters.⁴² Harrington flits in and out after 1660, and of course Hobbes was the devil incarnate.⁴³ For the rest, royalists directed their fire at the enemy of the moment, often an anonymous one in the 1680s, and usually reserved attacks by name for the great continental opponents of their doctrines.

It is a pity that they did not pay more attention to each other. One often has the feeling that they are repeating needlessly, that each is starting from scratch when he might well have started where another left off. This may partly explain the failure of any of them to construct a real system, something of the intellectual dimensions of a Filmer, a Hobbes or a Locke. Certainly some of them had the intellectual resources for such a system. But these resources were dissipated in frequently sterile debate, a form of writing which mixed acute formulations with the most tiresome bullyragging. It is possible to name several brilliant royalist thinkers, but quite impossible to name one pamphlet or book which consistently lives up to its author's abilities. Even the best are marred by impatient sneering, endless finger-wagging at Dissenters, simplistic attacks on popery, and long stretches of Bible-story and/or repetitions of Romans Thirteen and the unimaginable evil of resisting God's anointed, the legitimate monarch. Indeed it is not unusual to find that political theory *per se* occupies much the smaller part of such works, which were directed at an audience of which connoisseurs of political thought were by no means the majority. It is this heterogeneous content and raggedness in quality, almost as much as their political defeat, which has powerfully helped to deprive these men of more than perfunctory and condescending attention from students of the political thought of the age.

Such inattention underestimates their place in English political thought. Royalists did not produce a full-fledged, intellectually satisfactory political theory, but they represented what could have become one. They were Christian humanists, carrying into an increasingly hostile world a Renaissance view of man's relation to his fellows which was also a medieval view. No patient reader of their works can fail to realize that he is absorbing an education in English humanism, that the authors are unfolding an analysis of the political good, the good life lived in political society. Convinced of the existence of a knowable natural law, moral and binding on man, they tried to build on its foundations a political theory which grew out of the English

experience and developed in detail, but never changed in basic concept, according to the crises which shook the world of English government in this revolutionary century. The forces of intellectual and political change finally grew too strong to permit that theory to contain and direct them, and as royalism was severely mauled in practical political life, it was nearly forgotten in the world of the mind. But there was a long day before this sunset, and in it was produced a body of political ideas of more than antiquarian interest. They were ideas about the formation and stabilizing of political communities, the role of consent therein, the role of time and prescription in modifying governments, the relationship between different forms of government, the balance of forces within it and the community, the nature and limitations of sovereignty, and the tension between liberty and authority. Such ideas will always constitute the essential material of political thought. In dealing with them, royalists intelligently reflected on the human political condition as seen in their time. England disowned their work, and the men who made it, but it remains both a product of the English heritage and a part of it. To study it is to read a neglected chapter in the development of the English mind as it pondered the development of its own community and the larger European cultural inheritance.

NOTES

¹ The best introduction to royalist thought is still pp. 482-521 of J.W. Allen, *English Political Thought 1603-1644*, (London, 1938 and 1967). Also valuable are Margaret A. Judson, *The Crisis of the Constitution*, (London, 1949 and 1971), Ch. X; Perez Zagorin, *A History of Political Thought in the English Revolution*, (London, 1954), Ch. XIV; and John Plamenatz, *Man And Society*, Vol. I, (London, 1963), Ch. V. Also see J.W. Daly, "John Bramhall and the Theoretical Problems of Royalist Moderation", *Journal of British Studies*, Vol. XI, no. 1, November, 1971, pp. 26-44.

² As will I hope be evident, the conclusions in this paper are based on years of reading virtually all the important (and all too many unimportant) royalist authors. A book-length study of royalist political thought should someday issue from that reading, and I suppose that if the references found in this paper do not convince, the reader may have to await the much more substantial work. In this connection I should like to express my thanks to McMaster University and the Canada Council for generous assistance which has enabled me to carry on my research into this type of material.

³ For an interesting examination of the relation between common and Roman law, see Fritz Schulz, "Bracton on Kingship," *English Historical Review*, LX, 1945, pp. 136-76.

⁴ S.B. Chrimes, *English Constitutional History*, pp. 108-9 and Bertrand de Jouvenel, *Sovereignty*, (Cambridge, 1957), p. 79.

⁵ I do not think this conclusion is threatened by recent attempts to look more favourably on the notion of "Tudor despotism." The most prestigious attempt of this kind does not, it seems to me, challenge the necessity of strong royal government for any recognizable kind of liberty. See Joel Hurstfield, *Freedom, Corruption and Government in Elizabethan England*, (Cambridge, Mass., 1973), esp. Ch. I.

⁶ It is now conceded that the common lawyers more than held their own against any possibility of "reception" of Roman law or encroachment by prerogative courts. See Charles Ogilvie, *The King's Government and the Common Law, 1471-1641*, (Oxford, 1958).

⁷ T.S. Eliot, *The Literature of Politics*, (London, 1955), p. 22.

⁸ The best single source for this world-view is of course E.M.W. Tillyard's *The Elizabethan World Picture*, (London, 1943). Very detailed examination is found in Ruth L. Anderson, *Elizabethan Psychology and Shakespeare's Plays*, (Iowa City, 1927) and Theodore Spencer, *Shakespeare and the Nature of Man*, (New York, 2nd ed., 1948), esp. pp. 7-20. A good analysis of the philosophical characteristics is found in Hiram Haydn, *The Counter-Renaissance*, (New York, 1950), pp. 293-320, and a brief summary in Tillyard's *Shakespeare's History Plays*, (London, 1944), pp. 10-17.

⁹ It is clear that John Pym shared the harmonic way of looking at politics. Conrad Russell, "The Theory of Treason in the Trial of Strafford", *English Historical Review*, LXXX, 1965, pp. 30-50.

¹⁰ For a very different interpretation of the political implications of cosmic harmony, the reader may wish to consult W.H. Greenleaf, *Order, Empiricism and Politics*, (Oxford, 1964).

¹¹ It is good to be reminded, for example, that the work whose view of monarchy most resembles that of Sir John Eliot was James I's *Trew Law of Free Monarchies*. Harold Hulme, *The Life of Sir John Eliot*, (London, 1957), p. 375.

¹² M.A. Judson, *The Crisis of the Constitution*, Ch. II. It seems to me that the strength of the concept of balance *inside* other concepts of government vindicates the Judson interpretation against the alternative contention of R.W.K. Hinton, "English Constitutional Theories from Sir John Fortescue to Sir John Eliot", *English Historical Review*, LXXV, 1960, pp. 423-25.

¹³ Henry Ferne, *The Resolving of Conscience* (1642), *Conscience Satisfied* (1643), *A Reply Unto Several Treatises* (1643). Dudley Digges, *An Answer to a Printed Book* (1642), *The Unlawfulness of Subjects...* (1644). John Bramhall, *The Serpent-Salve* (1643). David Jenkins, *Lex Terrae* (1647).

¹⁴ The importance of the Answer has been established in C.C. Weston, "The Theory of Mixed Monarchy Under Charles I and After", *English Historical Review*, LXXV, 1960, pp. 426-43.

¹⁵ The unwary can misread this change of subject-matter and mistake it for "increasing absolutism". John M. Wallace, *Destiny His Choice: The Loyalty of Andrew Marvell*, (Cambridge, 1968), p. 14, following Merritt Y. Hughes (ed.), *Complete Prose Works of John Milton*, (New Haven & London, 1962), Vol. III, pp. 60-61. Royalist absolutism neither increases nor decreases; the writers are now defending the very monarchy itself, which had not been under attack earlier. Consequently they drop back to a more basic type of argument; this has no effect on the previous arguments.

¹⁶ John Bramhall, *The Catching of Leviathan* (1658). Peter Heylyn, *The Stumbling-Block of Disobedience* (1658). Robert Sheringham, *The King's Supremacy Asserted* (1660).

¹⁷ All can be found in *The Works of Robert Sanderson*, (Oxford, 1844).

¹⁸ John Nalson, *The Common Interest of King and People* (1678), *England Bought and Sold* (1681), *The Complaint of Liberty and Property* (1681). Nalson was also the editor of the *Impartial Collection* (1683), a source for the study of the 1640's which is only inferior to Rushworth's, to which it was intended as a correction. Thus Nalson was unusually familiar with material which had been used in the earlier crisis. William Falkner, *Christian Loyalty* (1679), George Hickes, *A Discourse of the Sovereign Power* (1682), *Jovian* (1683). Sir George Mackenzie, *That the Lawful Successor Cannot*

be *Debarr'd* . . . (1684), *Jus Regium* (1684). Robert Brady, *The Great Point of Succession Discussed* (1681), *A True and Exact History of the Succession* (1681), *A Complete History of England* (1685).

¹⁹ Sherlock's main works were *The Case of Allegiance due to Sovereign Powers* (1691) and *A Vindication of the Case of Allegiance* . . . (1691). The only analysis available of the Sherlock controversy is in Gerald M. Straka, *Anglican Reaction to the Revolution of 1688*, (Madison, Wis. 1962) and the same author's "The Final Phase of Divine Right Theory in England", *English Historical Review*, LXXVII, 1962, pp. 638-58.

²⁰ Hickes, *A Vindication of Some among Our Selves* (1692). Thomas Wagstaffe, *An Answer to a late Pamphlet* (1690), *An Answer to Dr. Sherlock's Case of Allegiance* (1691), *An Answer to Dr. Sherlock's Vindication* . . . (1692). Jeremy Collier, *Vindiciae Juris Regii* (1689), *Dr. Sherlock's Case of Allegiance Considered* (1691). Robert Jenkyn, *The Title of a Thorough Settlement Examined* (1691).

²¹ The curriculum of the universities (especially at Oxford) both reflected and reinforced the continuing dominance of Aristotelian thought among readers and writers who came from the educated classes. See William T. Costello S.J., *The Scholastic Curriculum at Early Seventeenth-Century Cambridge*, (Cambridge, Mass., 1958).

²² Filmer was acute enough as a student of Aristotle to correct the mistakes of other interpreters. So the term "twisting" must be applied to his attempt to deny that Aristotle considered limited monarchy a form of government. Contemporaries picked him up on this. *Patriarcha and Other Political Works of Sir Robert Filmer*, ed. Peter Laslett, (Oxford, 1949), pp. 79n, 106, 194, 304. Cf. Sir Roger Twysden, *Certain Considerations upon the Government of England*, ed. J.M. Kemble, Camden Society, 1849, p. 20; James Tyrrell, *Patriarcha non Monarcha* (1681), pp. 125-36; Algernon Sidney, *A Discourse Concerning Government* (1772 ed.), pp. 107-9. The reader will have noticed that I nowhere include Filmer among the royalist writers. Like everyone else I had always placed him among royalist political thinkers, but years of work on them have convinced me that he does not belong there, that his system was fundamentally incompatible with theirs. I have also found that he was almost entirely ignored by them, even in the 1680s when he is supposed to have been widely used by them. I realize that my interpretation demands abundant evidence, and that I intend to provide in a book on Filmer which I am now completing, a book which grew out of, and away from, the work on royalism mentioned in note 2 above. The scope of the present paper does not allow such treatment.

²³ Robert Grosse, *Royalty And Loyalty* (1647). James Usher, *The Power Communicated by God to the Prince* (1660). Falkner, *Christian Loyalty*. Sir Philip Warwick, *A Discourse of Government* (1694; written 1678). Nalson, *The Common Interest of King and People*. These sources, like others given among the following notes, by no means exhaust the list of royalists who use the authors concerned. They are merely illustrative of that use.

²⁴ The Senecan dictum was, "Ad Caesarem potestas omnium pertinet, ad singulos proprietates." John Digby, Earl of Bristol, *An Apologie of John, Earl of Bristol* (Caen, 1647; London, 1656), p. 65. Grosse, *Royalty and Loyalty*, p. 22. Warwick, *A Discourse*, p. 3. Mackenzie, *Jus Regium*, p. 50. The last makes the best use of the distinction. Bodin also used it, and it is possible that some authors ran across it in his works. J.H.M. Salmon, *The French Religious Wars in English Political Thought*, (Oxford, 1959), p. 61.

²⁵ Bramhill, *The Serpent-Salve*. Grosse, *Royalty And Loyalty*. Usher, *The Power Communicated*. Nalson, *The Common Interest of King and People*. Collier, *Dr. Sherlock's Case of Allegiance Considered*.

²⁶ Ferne, *A Reply Unto Several Treatises*. Grosse, *Royalty and Loyalty*.

Falkner, *Christian Loyalty*. Hickes, *Jovian*. Mackenzie, *Jus Regium*. *Jovian* is a good example of a work where careful distinction is made between the Roman and the English constitution.

²⁷ An exception to the rule is Grosse, *Royalty And Loyalty*, where Augustine is the favourite, though Chrysostom is also well represented. The Fathers, especially of the East, were a common source for royalists, which I think reflects the Anglican affinity for both Byzantine caesaropapism and the general patristic literature to which they so often appealed in their conflicts both with Rome and Geneva.

²⁸ It is found, for example, in three pamphlets issued almost within the space of one year (1643 and early 1644): Bramhall, *The Serpent-Salve, Works* (Oxford, 1843-45), III, p. 329; Digges, *The Unlawfulness of Subjects . . .*, p. 76; Sir John Spelman, *The Case of our Affaires*, p. 11.

²⁹ Virtually all the writers mentioned in this paper used such sources extensively, especially Coke.

³⁰ J.G.A. Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law*, (Cambridge, 1957), Chapter VIII. Brady did not succeed in forcing the Whigs to accept his version of the antiquity of parliaments, much less agree with the conclusions he drew from his version. Whigs continued to accept the alternative interpretation of William Petyt, which became orthodoxy after 1688. Nevertheless, he did provide impressive backing for the Tory case, which, together with Locke's influence, helps to explain the subsequent turning-away from historical into more abstract argument as the main basis for political theorizing.

³¹ John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government* ed. Peter Laslett, (Cambridge, 1963), p. 128. Zagorin, *History of Political Thought*, p. 197.

³² Pocock, *Ancient Constitution*, pp. 155-59. William M. Lamont, *Marginal Prynne*, (London and Toronto, 1963), pp. 177ff.

³³ Calvin could be used (prudently) to disarm the anti-royalism of Puritans who might be expected to revere his name. A notable case of such a tactic was Ferne's *Reply*. Undoubtedly the most impressive work to use sixteenth-century divines (and a huge number of others as well) was Abednigo Seller's *History of Passive Obedience Since the Reformation* (1689) with its *Continuation* (1690). It was a vast collection of quotations.

³⁴ Bramhall, *The Serpent-Salve*. Digges, *The Unlawfulness of Subjects . . .*. Grosse, *Royalty And Loyalty*. Falkner, *Christian Loyalty*. Thomas Comber, *Religion and Loyalty* (1681). Mackenzie, *Jus Regium*. Wagstaffe, *An Answer to Dr. Sherlock's Vindication*. The whole subject is treated throughout Professor Salmon's *French Religious Wars in English Political Thought*.

³⁵ Spelman, *A View of a Printed Book* (1642). Grosse, *Royalty And Loyalty*. Warwick, *A Discourse*. Falkner, *Christian Loyalty*. Collier, *Dr. Sherlock's Case of Allegiance Considered*.

³⁶ Falkner, *Christian Loyalty*. Mackenzie, *Jus Regium*. Thomas Goddard, *Plato's Demon* (1684). Hickes, *A Vindication*. Wagstaffe, *An Answer to Dr. Sherlock's Vindication*. Jenkyn, *The Title of a Thorough Settlement Examined*. Because of the material in dispute, and the time needed for Grotius' reputation to reach its height, his influence is much more pronounced in the latter part of the century.

³⁷ Bramhall's *Serpent-Salve*, Falkner's *Christian Loyalty* and Hickes' *Jovian* are also distinguished for the wide variety of sources quoted or evident. *Jovian* included two pages devoted to the list of authors consulted!

³⁸ There was at least one royalist who used none at all. The loyal but rather ineffectual William Cavendish, Marquess of Newcastle, who had commanded the royal army in the North from 1642 until his defeat at Marston Moor, prepared a remarkable paper of advice for Charles II in 1652. An uncompromising reactionary who

recommended a standing army officered by cadets of the gentry class, forts downriver from London to threaten the commerce of that rebellious city, and a reduction in the number of schools because lawyers cause trouble and are drawn from literate people, this autodidact admitted that his ideas were not taken from books, "for I seldom or ever read any". Newcastle, "Fragment on Government presented to Charles II", in *A Catalogue of Letters . . . exhibited in the library at Welbeck*, ed. S.A. Strong, (London, 1903), p. 173.

³⁹ This rule does not hold so consistently in the Sherlock controversy, when writers sometimes referred readers to another pamphlet where a subject is satisfactorily covered. The relatively clear definition of the controversy made this expedient more practical.

⁴⁰ Nathaniel Johnston, *The Excellency of Monarchical Government* (1686).

⁴¹ Ferne, Sheringham and Nalson dealt at great length with Hunton, and many others, e.g. Collier (*Vindiciae Juris Regii*), touch on his presentation of mixed monarchy in relation to sovereignty.

⁴² Milton is condemned twice in *The Judgment and Decree of the University of Oxford* (1683), which denounced twenty-seven offensive propositions on government. His *Ready And Easy Way* was the prime target of George Starkey's *The Dignity of Kingship Asserted* (1660), which Wing incorrectly attributed to Gilbert Sheldon. The unfortunate Baxter is condemned five times in the same document. It was Baxter's fate not only to suffer persecution during the Restoration, but to be pilloried incessantly by Tory journalists like Sir Roger L'Estrange.

⁴³ Harrington's *Oceana* was the subject of Matthew Wren's *Monarchy Asserted* (1669), of which Sir Philip Warwick thought enough to claim that Wren had quite drowned *Oceana: A Discourse*, p. 114. But Wren is unique among royalists for accepting a rather Hobbesian basis for political society, though without mentioning Hobbes by name. (*Monarchy Asserted*, 77-79, 93.) Yet Warwick could accompany his admiration for Wren with considerable criticism of Hobbes, along conventional royalist lines, never apparently noticing the Hobbesian influence on Wren. Bramhall's *Catching of Leviathan* is a very typical royalist response to Hobbes; for others, see John Bowle, *Hobbes And His Critics*, (London, 1951), and Falkner, *Christian Loyalty*, the *Oxford Judgment and Decree*, Anon., *Providence and Precept* (1691), Collier, *Dr. Sherlock's Case of Allegiance Considered*.